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Explaining Evil:
The Holocaust in Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem

Scott Richard St. Louis
Grand Valley State University

Incalculable amounts of intellectual and emotional energy have been spent by scholars
from a myriad of disciplines in an ongoing attempt to understand how individuals could ever
bring themselves to commit the crimes of the Holocaust. One work in particular, Hannah
Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, constitutes essential reading for students of the Holocaust,
attracting great scrutiny even half a century after its initial publication.1 When studied
alongside two more recent books, Arendt’s work helps those seeking introduction to the
history of the Holocaust to familiarize themselves with lasting debates on the concept of
individual moral responsibility in the Holocaust.
In her analysis of Adolf Eichmann, Arendt emphasizes with worried tone the normal
occupational and psychological background of the infamous Schutzstaffel (SS) officer, who
rose to this position of administrative authority after having been a poor student and meager
vacuum oil salesman before Hitler’s rise to absolute power. 2 Expecting to lay her eyes upon a
monster nearly glowing with a distinct aura of evil following her arrival to the Israeli
courtroom where Eichmann’s trial took place, Arendt saw instead a balding, middle-aged
former businessman, certified as “normal” by six psychiatrists (one of whom considered
Eichmann “[m]ore normal” than even himself; another actually deemed his psychological
See Roger Berkowitz, “Misreading ‘Eichmann in Jerusalem,’ ” The New York Times, July 7, 2013, accessed
September 20, 2014, nyti.ms/1p50nDl
2
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963; republished New York:
Penguin, 1994), 28-29.
1
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outlook “desirable”). 3 Eichmann’s commonplace physical appearance—combined with a
frustrating tendency to defend himself with ideas repeated so frequently as to be rendered
completely stale—led Arendt to conclude that evil in the modern world is characterized not
by black-and-white distinguishability, but instead by a deceptively simple banality.
Despite the heated controversy that marked its reception half a century ago, Eichmann
in Jerusalem warrants careful reading and thorough discussion by Holocaust students of the
present day for several reasons. First, the case of Adolf Eichmann should not be interpreted in
a vacuum as an oddity worthy only of revulsion and swift dismissal. Despite his prominent
position within the unwieldy, adversarial Nazi bureaucracy, Eichmann was but one of
thousands of bureaucrats extensively involved in the development and execution of Hitler’s
most vague and sinister demand: the goal of realizing the complete annihilation of European
Jewry by any means deemed feasible. It follows logically that to see Eichmann as nothing
more than a lunatic placed within a system tragically well-suited to his talents would be akin
to characterizing a significant portion of German society during the Third Reich as
thoroughly insane, a notion that is patently untenable on its face and contradictory to the
evaluations of the half dozen psychiatrists previously mentioned.
The unwavering pride shown by Eichmann, even at his trial, for the fact that he
carried out his charges to the fullest extent of his ability challenges common notions about
the supposedly inherent morality associated with hard work and efficient use of resources in
and of themselves; indeed, this is the area in which the most enduring value of Arendt’s work
is contained. This challenge is echoed by the implications drawn from sentiments expressed
by other administrators of the Final Solution after the collapse of Nazi Germany. In his 1946
War Crimes Testimony at Nuremberg, Rudolf Hoess, commander of the extermination camp
at Auschwitz, explained in an almost self-congratulatory fashion his role in ensuring that the

3

Arendt, Eichmann, 26-27.
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genocidal practices implemented at Auschwitz constituted “improvements” upon the model
developed at Treblinka in at least two respects: increased holding capacity for gas chambers
and the use of deception upon imminent victims of execution. 4 To the extent that the
importance of taking pride in one’s work – not explicitly one’s moral work – is a value still
passionately inculcated in the members of many societies today, Arendt’s chilling conclusion
that “ultimately the entire human race sits beside the defendant in the dock” 5 rings alarmingly
true even half a century after its initial publication; in this regard at least, there remains “an
Eichmann in every one of us.” 6
A second value that readers of today may still see in Arendt’s work is an
understanding of how Weber’s theory of the “steel-hard casing” 7 is readily observable in the
history of modern bureaucratization. From Eichmann’s careerist ambitions, imaginative and
enthusiastic embellishment of vague orders issued by bureaucratic superiors, and personal
pride in the efficiency of his professional actions, we can see that humans are enabled to
ignore the moral implications of their actions through a social rationalization that emphasizes
meticulously calculated control and efficiency above all else. In other words, if Arendt’s
assertion that the murderous potential of Eichmann rests within every individual is true due to
those values held both by the desk-bound killers of the Third Reich and by members of
advanced societies from the time of her writing all the way to the present, then it follows that

Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess, “Affidavit, 5 April 1946,” in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the
International Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946 (Nuremberg: Secretariat of the
International Military Tribunal, 1949), Doc. 3868PS, vol. 33, 27579.
5
Arendt, Eichmann, 286.
6
Arendt, Eichmann, 286.
7
Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Stephen Kalberg (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 177. Weber’s phrase in the original German – stahlhartes Gehäuse – has more
commonly been interpreted to mean “iron cage,” as first written in the well-known 1930 translation of Weber’s
Protestant Ethic by sociologist Talcott Parsons. However, some recent Weber scholars have questioned this
translation, using phrases more similar to Stephen Kalberg’s “steel-hard casing.” For discussion on competing
interpretations of Weber’s German phrase, see Peter Baehr, “The ‘Iron Cage’ and the ‘Shell as Hard as Steel’:
Parsons, Weber, and the Stahlhartes Gehäuse Metaphor in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,”
History and Theory 40 (May 2001): 153-169.
4
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the capability for mechanized genocide persists in these societies, in light of the growing
bureaucratization of life after the Second World War and into the twenty-first century.
In this regard, Weber’s metaphorical conception of a “steel-hard casing” 8 that enables
individuals to compartmentalize reality is reinforced by the phenomenon known as cognitive
dissonance, demonstrated by Eichmann at his trial in Israel. For example, Eichmann was
asked the following question (in German) by one of the trial’s three presiding judges: “Did
you ever feel a crisis of conscience?” 9 Eichmann replied that “there were times when I felt as
if I were in a conscious split state, when I had to retreat into one side from the other in order
to obey my orders.” 10 If Eichmann’s remark is accepted at face value, he managed to create
for himself a psychological framework in which he separated his actions from the moral
views regarding human life that he had been taught long before the ascent of Nazism in
Germany. Such an outlook would have enabled him to claim an understanding of and belief
in the immorality of murder alongside a simultaneous conviction that he had done nothing
wrong in his function as a lieutenant colonel of the Schutzstaffel (SS).
Even if one does not believe Eichmann’s comment to be true, similar instances of
rationalization-through-compartmentalization among other desk-bound killers working for
the Third Reich are well documented. Walter Stier, a railway clerk stationed near Krakow
during the Holocaust, explained to an interviewer that he worked day and night during the
latter half of the war to process a high volume of “eastbound traffic,” including many “special
trains.” 11 Even as late as the 1980s, Stier asserted that his complicity in the Holocaust was
negligible due to his strictly bureaucratic function: clerking at the last station before the final
“destination” (Treblinka). 12 Stier insisted that he “had no idea that Treblinka meant
extermination” and that he had never heard a word about what was happening at Auschwitz,
Weber, Protestant Ethic, 177.
The Specialist: Portrait of a Modern Criminal, directed by Eyal Sivan (Berlin: Kino International, 1999).
10
The Specialist: Portrait of a Modern Criminal, directed by Eyal Sivan (Berlin: Kino International, 1999).
11
Shoah, directed by Claude Lanzmann (New York: New Yorker Films, 1985).
12
Shoah, directed by Claude Lanzmann (New York: New Yorker Films, 1985).
8
9
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even though he was working just 40 miles away. 13 While it is virtually impossible that Stier
had no knowledge whatsoever about what happened to the Jews densely packed onto “special
trains” during the Holocaust, one sees in his hollow assertion of innocence the same sort of
cognitive dissonance that Eichmann described for the judge. In other words, Stier built
Weber’s “steel-hard casing” 14 around himself by rationalizing his complicity in genocide
through a compartmentalization of reality, in which his duty to follow orders had no relation
whatsoever to his beliefs on the immorality of murder. Stier considered himself a moral
person by way of his deference to authority, chasing away from his conscience the glaring
reality that it was exactly this uncritical deference which made his actions immoral in nature.
Stier’s comments also remind one of the fact that the Nazi bureaucracy was carefully
structured to promote such compartmentalization as a way to mitigate the psychological
stress of the work at hand for desk-bound perpetrators: “special trains,” for example, were
actually cattle cars packed so tightly with soon-to-be victims of genocide that many died of
suffocation and disease before reaching the death camps. The meticulous documentation that
accompanied the Third Reich’s implementation of genocidal policy confirms the use of
additional euphemisms as a way to promote rationalization through the compartmentalization
of reality. A form containing transcribed SS radio station orders from Auschwitz requested
“permission for a truck to Dessau to fetch material [camp detainees] for special treatment
[murder in the gas chambers]” (emphasis added). 15 Today – in a society which largely
dismisses innocent civilians killed in drone strikes overseas as “collateral damage” and
regularly describes the torture of war prisoners as “enhanced interrogation” – the problem of
serious wrongdoing being tacitly understood, dramatically understated, and repeatedly
permitted shows that the serious moral problems of distorting reality through rationalization,
compartmentalization, and euphemistic language remain all too real.
Shoah, directed by Claude Lanzmann (New York: New Yorker Films, 1985).
Weber, Protestant Ethic, 177.
15
SS Radio Station orders, Auschwitz, August 26, 1942, Wannsee Conference Archive, Berlin.
13
14
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In spite of the lasting value of Arendt’s work, there are two serious flaws in her
analysis that accentuate each other quite severely: first, her assignment of blame for much of
the suffering that occurred during the Holocaust to the Jews who were targeted by the Nazis;
and second, her failure to acknowledge that Eichmann – an enthusiastic implementer of Nazi
genocidal policy – was indeed a responsible perpetrator who knew that he was committing
moral atrocities, but chose to continue with his work in the SS. Arendt argues that
“[w]herever Jews lived, there were recognized Jewish leaders, and this leadership, almost
without exception, cooperated in one way or another, for one reason or another, with the
Nazis.” 16 She seeks to support this point by referencing instances of Jews and Gentiles
accepting the categorization of Jews in hopes of prompting the Nazis to construct more
inclusive definitions of “privileged” groups, members of which appeared to stand a better
chance of surviving Hitler’s attempt to destroy European Jewry: “the acceptance of privileged
categories—German Jews as against Polish Jews, war veterans and decorated Jews as against
ordinary Jews, families whose ancestors were German-born as against recently naturalized
citizens, etc.—had been the beginning of the moral collapse of respectable Jewish
society...” 17
What Arendt fails to take into account regarding those who sought to save their peers
in this way is that they were confronted with a perplexing dilemma, that of either seeking to
save some parts of the imperiled Jewish community in Europe by interacting with an
oppressive and powerful regime in order to alleviate the effects of its genocidal policy, or
risking total failure – and thus complete elimination – by expressing dissent and encouraging
resistance. When considered in this way, one can see that the Jews and Gentiles who sought
to save their peers by supporting the conferral of privileged status upon a lucky few did not
have much of a choice at all, especially when one recalls the stark reality that “they had
16
17

Arendt, Eichmann, 125.
Arendt, Eichmann, 131-133.
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possessed … no army … no caches of weapons, no youth with military training” 18 with
which to fight the Nazis, had they chosen the second option. Arendt’s suggestion that this
approach made the Jews complicit in their own destruction is unconvincing at best.
Although Arendt is willing to assign some degree of blame to Jews for the extent of
the Holocaust itself, she remains needlessly inconclusive regarding Eichmann’s indisputable
guilt as a knowledgeable, willing, and enthusiastic perpetrator of genocidal crimes. Worse,
Arendt’s analysis actually comes close to mirroring the arguments advanced by Eichmann
and Stier, who posited that the bureaucratic nature of their work eliminated the possibility of
their understanding its direct connection to the worst atrocities of the Third Reich: “The
trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were
neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly
normal…this normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together, for it
implied…that this new type of criminal, who is in actual fact hostis generis humani, commits
his crimes under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or feel that
he is doing wrong.” 19
Arendt’s conclusion regarding the nature of Eichmann’s work is difficult to believe
when one considers that the defendant himself acknowledged that he could only continue
performing his murderous deeds by compartmentalizing his perception of reality and, in so
doing, ignoring whatever pangs of conscience struck him as he completed his assignments.
Eichmann did not walk away from his murderous work, in spite of the fact that no evidence
has been found to support the idea that he would have suffered punishment had he chosen to
do so. As an individual whose formative years occurred well before the rise of Hitler, and
who admitted at his own trial to compartmentalizing his view of reality in such a way as to
repress the wailings of his conscience, one may safely conclude that Eichmann knew he was
18
19

Arendt, Eichmann, 125.
Arendt, Eichmann, 276.
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doing wrong and chose to continue working as a facilitator and promoter of the greatest crime
in history.
Given the weaker aspects of Arendt’s book, students of the Holocaust should read
Eichmann in Jerusalem alongside more recent works that explore the concept of individual
responsibility in the perpetration of genocide. Indeed, Christopher Browning’s book Ordinary
Men derives value of its own from the compelling argument that it advances regarding the
capability of individuals and entire societies to become willfully immersed in terrible crimes.
As a historian who openly embraces a multi-causal approach to understanding the motives of
Reserve Police Battalion 101 in carrying out the Final Solution in Poland, Browning focuses
on a number of motives applicable in varying degrees amongst members of the battalion to
explain why most of them made the choice to kill. For example, Browning examines racism,
careerism, deference to authority, wartime brutalization of conscience, and pressures to
conform along lines of perceived ideals, including comradeship and masculinity. 20
Furthermore, in describing the background of the men in Reserve Police Battalion
101, Browning is careful to point out that special selection of the ranks (in order to ensure
that those carrying out the massacres would be those best suited to the work) almost certainly
did not occur. After all, the vast majority of the men in the battalion were from Hamburg, 21
one of the least Nazified cities in all of Germany throughout the duration of the Third Reich.
About 63 percent of the rank-and-file members in the battalion came from a working-class
background, most holding such positions as dock worker, truck driver, warehouse worker,
construction worker, machine operator, seaman, waiter, or police officer. 22 About 35 percent
were in the lower middle class, most of these being involved in sales of some sort. 23 Only
two percent were middle-class professionals, though these positions too – like those of
Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (1993,
republished, New York: Harper, 1998), 159.
21
Browning, Ordinary Men, 47.
22
Browning, Ordinary Men, 47.
23
Browning, Ordinary Men, 47.
20
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druggist and teacher – were modest at best. 24 Taken as a whole, the prevailing socioeconomic
background of these men suggests a strong likelihood that at least a few of them were, at
some point before 1933, integrated into political cultures that had opposed the ascent of
Nazism, including communists, socialists, and labor union members whom the Nazis would
hardly have seen as promising recruits for the implementation of Hitler’s genocidal visions. 25
Moreover, the average age of the men was 39 years, and over half were between 37 and 42;
in other words, this was a group that would have experienced its formative years well before
the rise of Hitler in the early 1930s. 26 The men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 hardly had
anything in common with the Third Reich’s ideal conception of young, educated, enthusiastic
SS officials who had been raised to believe in the tenets of Nazism and trained in a system
designed to provide requisite skills for the execution of genocide.
In light of the fact that the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 were hardly prone to
throwing their blind and wholehearted support behind exterminationist anti-Semitism before
going to Poland to kill Jews, Browning seeks to explain their murderous choices as an
example of previously held prejudices being accentuated through the implementation of
“atrocity by policy,” 27 which would encourage (as a rationalizing device) the wartime
dehumanization of the perceived enemy as a monstrous “other.” Indeed, Browning asserts
that the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 provide just one example of this wartime
rationalization-through-hatred in the history of the twentieth century: “From the Nazi ‘war of
destruction’ in eastern Europe and ‘war against the Jews’ to the ‘war without mercy’ in the
Pacific and most recently Vietnam, soldiers have all too often tortured and slaughtered
unarmed civilians and helpless prisoners, and committed numerous other atrocities…War, a
struggle between “our people” and “the enemy,” creates a polarized world in which ‘the
Browning, Ordinary Men, 47-48.
Browning, Ordinary Men, 48.
26
Browning, Ordinary Men, 48.
27
Browning, Ordinary Men, 162
24
25
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enemy’ is easily objectified and removed from the community of human
obligation…Distancing, not frenzy and brutalization, is one of the keys to the behavior of
Reserve Police Battalion 101. War and negative racial stereotyping were two mutually
reinforcing factors in this distancing.” 28
Browning also argues that racism must be addressed as just one motive of the men
insofar as it was reinforced, encouraged, and thus made more powerful by the war itself. For
such men as those in Reserve Police Battalion 101, whose backgrounds offer little to suggest
that they would become the murderous first-hand implementers of the Final Solution in
Poland, the existence of an exterminationist anti-Semitism before the war makes very little
sense.
As a work focused specifically on addressing the many reasons why most men of
Reserve Police Battalion made a personal choice to kill in the utter absence of being forced to
do so, Browning’s book offers a more satisfactory account of perpetrators’ motives than does
Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem. After all, Arendt’s energies were spent not only on
assessing Eichmann’s motives, but also on the complex question of whether the
bureaucratization of the Final Solution meant that he was incapable of understanding the
extreme immorality of his actions. Given his sharper focus on the motives of the perpetrators,
Browning is able to provide a more readily accessible account of the factors that drove the
perpetrators of the Holocaust in eastern Europe to commit such terrible deeds.
However, despite its appealing acknowledgment of the complexity of individual
decision-making, and its consistent adherence to the findings of relevant documentary
evidence, the multi-causal argument advanced by Browning in Ordinary Men has elicited
serious concern from other historians, who question his heavy reliance on the postwar
testimonies of the perpetrators themselves. Indeed, Browning’s use of this evidence as the

28

Browning, Ordinary Men, 160-162.
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backbone of his analysis becomes especially worrisome when one considers that the many
motives other than racism offered in the testimonies of the perpetrators might have
constituted nothing more than self-exculpatory lies. As Browning himself stated: “The
testimony is marked by similar omissions concerning German attitudes toward Jews. One
reason for this is stark legal consideration. According to German law, among the criteria for
defining homicide as murder is the presence of a ‘base motive,’ such as racial hatred. Any
member of the battalion who openly confessed to anti-Semitism would have seriously
compromised his legal position; anyone who talked about the anti-Semitic attitudes of others
risked finding himself in the uncomfortable position of witness against his former
comrades.” 29 With this passage in mind, Browning’s aforementioned conclusion – that racial
hatred motivated Reserve Police Battalion 101 only insofar as wartime dehumanization
exacerbated an originally non-exterminationist anti-Semitism—arguably needs a more
diverse array of sources.
The reaction against this weakness in Browning’s work largely motivated Daniel
Goldhagen’s writing of Hitler’s Willing Executioners, wherein he describes German history
as being marked by a particularly virulent strand of anti-Semitism that Hitler only had to
unleash in order to bring about the Holocaust. Indeed, Goldhagen asserts that men on the
eastern front, such as those in Reserve Police Battalion 101, were driven to kill innocent
civilians solely by way of the violent anti-Semitism they had embraced even before Hitler’s
rise to power: “Most of them, as the training schedules show, also had very little training
because the Nazi regime and the Order Police did not conceive of the possibility that much
further ideological preparation would be necessary in order to gain these men’s accedence
and willing cooperation in Jew-killing…By choosing not to excuse themselves from the
genocide of the Jews, the Germans in police battalions themselves indicated that they wanted

29

Browning, Ordinary Men, 150.
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to be genocidal executioners.” 30 Although Goldhagen’s work points out an important
shortcoming in Browning’s book, his argument as a whole is less convincing than that of
Ordinary Men because of its structural reliance on the fallacious idea of a German Sonderweg
(“special path”), which is supported by virtually no evidence in the overall composition of
Holocaust perpetrators in eastern Europe. After all, Browning’s research shows that Latvian
and Lithuanian hiwis participated in almost every atrocity that Reserve Police Battalion 101
carried out. 31 Simply stated, Goldhagen’s overall argument is far more problematic than
Browning’s because of its disregard for the international reach of eliminationist antiSemitism in twentieth-century Europe and its reductionist claim that the men were motivated
to commit genocide solely out of hatred for Jews, with no eye toward their own personal gain
through career advancement or the establishment of a good reputation with one’s comrades.
The arguments advanced by Arendt, Browning, and Goldhagen together constitute an
excellent starting point for students seeking greater familiarity with challenging discussions
regarding individual complicity in the Holocaust. Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem is relevant
even today in light of the important questions it asks about the very nature of morality and
individual responsibility in a bureaucratized and largely depersonalized world. Browning’s
Ordinary Men, by virtue of its keen focus on a number of motivational factors that were all
likely present in Reserve Police Battalion 101, offers a valuable explanation of why the
citizens of an advanced industrial society chose to act with such unmitigated barbarity.
Lastly, Hitler’s Willing Executioners by Goldhagen forces readers to confront the possibility
that hate alone can indeed motivate human beings to commit atrocious acts of violence.
However, all historical sources – primary and secondary – have their own unique values and
limitations in what they can and cannot tell historians, and the works of these three famous
authors are by no means exempt from this important rule in the study of history.
Daniel J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York:
Vintage, 1996), 277-279.
31
Browning, Ordinary Men, 52, 80-81, 83-85, 89-91, 93-95, 99, 104, 106, 107-110, 115, 158, 163.
30
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